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Abstract
Post-Keynesian macroeconomics faces several challenges. The labor
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Introduction

Contemporary DSGE models represent the culmination of a failed research program. But what do we put in their place? Post-Keynesian macroeconomics has
many strengths but also faces signiÖcant challenges.
Post-Keynesians agree that aggregate demand plays a key role in both the
short run and the long run. It is essential, however, to consider the dynamic
interactions across goods, labor and Önancial markets, and the labor market
and the supply side have not been getting the attention that they deserve in
post-Keynesian growth theory. The failings of the Lucas-type ímicroeconomic
foundationsí, second, must not lead to a neglect of microeconomic behavior.
Convincing macroeconomic theories must consider and address the connections
between macroeconomic relations and the microeconomic behavior whose aggregate manifestation the relations represent. Most economic behavior is goal
oriented, and the goal orientation can have important implications, even though
optimization in any strict sense is impossible. Microeconomic behavior, third,
takes place within an institutional structure that shapes economic behavior and
economic outcomes. Macroeconomic theory must be both behavioral and structuralist.
The argument for a behavioral and structuralist approach to the development
of post-Keynesian theory is presented by way of three examples. The Örst
example illustrates the importance of a structural constraint that is ignored in
contemporary mainstream macroeconomic models. The example, which will not
be controversial among post-Keynesians, relates to the Önancial sphere and the
determination of the average saving rate in a corporate economy (section 2).
The second example may be more controversial. It focuses on labor markets
and the treatment of the supply side in post-Keynesian models of economic
growth (section 3). The third example takes o§ from well-known debates among
post-Keynesians about the potential instability of the goods market and the
implications of this instability (section 4).1
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Saving in a corporate economy

Di§erential saving rates may arise for a variety of reasons. The recipients of
proÖt income (ícapitalistsí and írentiersí) tend to be rich, and rich households
tend to save a larger proportion of their income than poor households. Duesenberryís relative income hypothesis has this implication, even if there are no
intrinsic di§erences in the preferences of rich and poor. Di§erences in saving
rates could also arise because capitalists are more ípatientí than workers and
therefore save a larger fraction of their income. Kaldor (1966), however, suggested a very di§erent, structural explanation. The di§erential saving rates, he
1 Jesper Jespersen has suggested that my three examples could have been given ímethodological headingsí and that the Örst example addresses a ífallacy of compositioní, the second
a ífallacy of ceteris paribusí, and the third a ífallacy of closed system analysisí. Jespersen
(2009), Chick (2003) and Dow (2002) are among the contributions that have analyzed these
and other fallacies.
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argued, are rooted in the structure of a corporate economy: the saving rate out
of proÖts is high because Örms choose to retain some fraction of their proÖts.
It may appear that this argument can be made quite simply. In a closed
economy without public sector, householdsí áow of disposable income (Y D ) is
given by
YD =Y "R
where R is retained earnings. If retained earnings are proportional to proÖts
and households save a constant fraction s of their disposable income, aggregate
saving ñ the sum of household and corporate saving (S H and S F ) ñ is given by
S

= S H + S F = sY D + R
= [s + sf (1 " s)%]Y

where % is the proÖt share. Thus, it would seem that an increase in the proÖt
share must raise the average saving rate. The proportionality between household
saving and household disposable income is questionable, however. Wealth also
matters for consumption and saving, and retained earnings may generate capital
gains that increase wealth.
The orthodox view suggests that if a corporation withholds earnings, households as the ultimate owners of the corporation will be able to ídeclare their own
dividendsí. Retained earnings can be used by the Örm to Önance investment,
and the associated increase in future proÖts raises the value of the Örmís shares.
Thus, if a household wants to spend dividends it did not receive, the household
simply sells a fraction of its shares in the company. Since the share price has
gone up, this leaves the household in exactly the same situation as if it had
received the dividends (rather than the capital gain). For practical purposes,
the argument goes, one can ignore corporate saving as an ináuence on aggregate
saving.
The intuition behind Kaldorís counterargument is simple. The suggestion
that share prices will appreciate automatically in line with retained earnings
involves a fallacy of composition, Kaldor argued. It may be correct that the
share price of a single Örm (relative to the general level of share prices) responds
positively to an increase in the Örmís retained earnings. It is also correct that
an individual shareholder can declare her own dividends by selling a part of
her holdings of stocks that have appreciated in value. But households as a
group cannot Önance consumption by selling shares: there is no one to buy,
and householdsí attempts to compensate for compressed dividends by selling o§
equity will lead to capital losses as equity prices fall. The capital losses temper
the desire to consume, and the average saving rate increases as a result of the
rise in corporate retentions.2
Kaldorís analysis considered the determination of the average saving rate,
conditional on Örmsí Önancial decisions, including the retention rate and the
rate of new issues of equity. This conditionality might appear to be a limitation
2 Skott (1981) addressed some weaknesses in Kaldorís original 1966 formulation of the íneoPasinetti theoremí.

3

since undoubtedly there are feedback e§ects from Önancial markets (as well as
from goods and labor markets) to these Önancial decisions.
Households would be calling the tune with respect to the average saving
rate if Örms made Önance decisions that fully reáect householdsí preferences,
information and expectations. Analogously, households would call the tune with
respect to the amount of saving if Örms always made investment decisions that
matched the amount of saving at full employment. But dynamic feedback e§ects
between consumption, investment and Önance decisions do not automatically
solve these coordination problems. The feedback e§ects need not even produce
adjustments in the right direction.
Consider a simple scenario in which for some reason Örms on average decide
to reduce dividends and raise the retention rate. The macroeconomic e§ect of
this change in Örmsí Önancial behavior is a rise in the average saving rate and a
fall in aggregate demand. The aggregate demand problem could be corrected if
Örms responded to a decline in output and capacity utilization by reducing the
retention rate to its former level. But why would a fall in aggregate demand
and capacity utilization make Örms want to increase dividends? A destabilizing
reduction in investment and dividends would seem a more likely response.
DSGE models have paid little or no attention to Önancial issues and to
the interaction between goods and Önancial markets. Galiís (2016) íbasic New
Keynesian modelí has no capital and no investment. There are Önancial assets,
but all households are identical, there is no trade in Önancial assets, and the
net Önancial position is zero for all households. More elaborate DSGE models
include investment. But in the Smets-Wouters (2007) model, which is still
being lauded as "a standard reference" (Blanchard 2016, p.1), investment in
Öxed capital is carried out by households who rent capital services to Örms.
Financial assets and Önancial mechanisms have been hard to ignore following the Önancial crisis. Recognizing that the Smets-Wouters model "needs a
cocktail of extremely unlikely shocks" to account for the depth of the recession
after the Önancial crisis, Linde, Smets and Wouters (2016, p.1) propose three
extensions. One of these is the introduction of a íÖnancial acceleratorí along the
lines of Bernanke et al. (1999). The producers of Önal goods still rent capital
services, but households now save in the form of bank deposits, and Önal-good
producers buy the capital services from íentrepreneursí. Investment is undertaken by the entrepreneurs, and the investment is Önanced in part by external
Önance. Asymmetric information implies that external Önance is subject to a
risk premium, and the size of the premium depends on entrepreneursí net worth.
The extensions make it easier for the model to produce deep recessions and
to account for the slow recovery after the Önancial crisis. The account, however, relies heavily on exogenous stochastic shocks to net worth (rather than on
endogenous dynamics in net worth), and it seems striking how little has been
achieved a full decade after the Önancial crisis. Following a standard Önancial
accelerator model, Linde et al. assume that entrepreneurs die at a Öxed rate
(independently of their age), that surviving entrepreneurs save all proÖts, and
that the death rate and the resulting turnover among entrepreneurs prevent
entrepreneurs from gradually accumulating su¢cient wealth to become fully
4

self-Önanced. These assumptions stand in sharp contrast to actual Önancial behavior, and the analysis completely ignores the changes in Önancial behavior
that have occurred since the 1980s. Corporate retention rates have declined,
share buy backs have soared with net new issues of shares turning negative,
and the balance sheets of non-Önancial corporations have seen large increases
in both Önancial assets and Önancial liabilities.3 If small áuctuations in net
worth over the business cycle are deemed worthy of explicit analysis because
of their e§ect on the risk premium, these changes in Önancial behavior ñ which
a§ect net worth ñ would seem to require very careful attention. And, as argued
above, changes in Örmsí Önancial behavior may have implications, not just for
net worth but also for the average saving rate.

3

Labor markets and the supply side

ILO (2017) reports unemployment rates of 4.0 % in Mexico and 3.5% in India
in 2016. If one were to take these data at face value, Europe su§ered much
worse unemployment: the reported average unemployment rate was 9.3% for
íNorthern, Southern and Western Europeí. But the recorded unemployment
rates make no sense as indicators of the slack in the labor market and the
ability of the economies to expand without encountering labor shortages.
Even at a highly abstract level it is important to distinguish between ídual
economiesí like India that have huge reserves of underemployed workers and ímature economiesí like western Europe that may have signiÖcant unemployment,
but where the measured unemployment rate conveys meaningful information
about state of the labor market: an attempt by policy makers in western Europe to match Chinese growth rates by boosting aggregate demand by 10 percent
a year would soon run into labor market constraints. In principle, immigration
could relieve these constraints, but political forces block this route.
Maturity, it must be emphasized, does not imply ífull employmentí or a
Friedmanite ënatural rate of unemploymentí. Nor does it imply that the longrun rate of growth is independent of aggregate demand.
If the labor supply and labor productivity grow at rates that are exogenously
given, the existence of a stable ínatural rate of unemploymentí would undermine
the relevance of aggregate demand for the medium and long run. This is the
premise of most mainstream theory. But there is no ínatural rate of unemploymentí. The empirical evidence for a ínatural rate of unemploymentí was weak
even before the Önancial crisis (e.g. Howell et al. 2007), and the slow recovery
has revived interest in employment hysteresis, even within the mainstream (e.g.
DeLong and Summers 2012).
Path dependency (hysteresis) in employment can arise for a number of reasons. One mechanism that has both a¢nities with heterodox theory and support from behavioral evidence focuses on ífairnessí. It is well documented that
3 The observed changes in Örmsí Önancial behavior are often seen as an aspect of íÖnancializationí. The label itself does not explain why Örms have changed behavior. Promising steps
towards a better understanding can be found in Davis (2018).
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perceptions of fairness play an important role in wage formation. It is also
well documented that norms of fairness change endogenously. Kahneman et al.
(1986, p. 730) put is as follows
any stable state of a§airs tends to become accepted eventually, at
least in the sense that alternatives to it no longer readily come to
mind.
Social psychologists and behavioral economists may have strengthened the evidence for path dependency, but a recognition of the conventional character of
wage norms has a long history. Statements similar to the one by Kahneman et
al. can be found in the writings of Marshall, Keynes and Hicks.4
Path dependency in wage norms naturally leads to path dependency in employment. Distributional conáict is a source of ináation, and wage targets will
be strongly ináuenced by perceptions of what is fair. If the fair wage (or the fair
rate of increase in wages) is path dependent, the employment rate associated
with constant ináation also becomes path dependent. The path dependency
in the norms of fairness, moreover, can generate path dependencies in relative
earnings which may contribute to an understanding of movements in income
inequality (Skott 2005).
The non-existence of a natural rate of unemployment opens the door for
aggregate demand to ináuence the employment rate. This level e§ect can, in
turn, have repercussions for the long-run rate of growth. If the employment rate
is constant, the growth rate of output must be equal to the sum of the growth
rate of labor productivity and the growth rate of the labor force, but both the
rate of technical change and the growth rate of the labor force may depend on
the state of the labor market.
Several speciÖcations have been used to capture this general argument. In
one of his speciÖcations, Dutt (2006) relates the growth rate of the growth rate
of labor productivity to the level of the employment rate. Formally,5
a
^ = f (e " e0 );

f 0 (e) > 0; f (0) = 0

(1)

where a denotes the growth rate of labor productivity (and a
^ is the growth rate
of the growth rate of productivity); e is the employment rate. Duttís formulation
in equation (1) implies that productivity growth is perfectly elastic. If aggregate
demand keeps the employment rate above e0 , the growth rate of productivity
will keep rising. There is no upper bound on productivity growth, and there can
be no long-run supply constraints from the labor market: no full employment
ceiling can prevent the US or the European economies from maintaining annual
growth rates of 5, 10 or 20 percent, according to this speciÖcation.
4 Hicks

(1975, p. 65) argued that no system of wages,

when it is called into question, will ever be found to be fair. ... [To avoid the
system being called into question] the system of wages should be well established,
so that it has the sanction of custom. It then becomes what is expected; and
(admittedly on a low level of fairness) what is expected is fair. .
5 Dutt

also considers an alternative version in which a
^ is proportional to e^:
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A less extreme speciÖcation relates the growth rates of the labor supply and
labor productivity to the employment rate (Flaschel and Skott 2006). Formally,
we may have
a + n = g(e);
g0 > 0
(2)
where a+n is the ínatural rate of growthí, that is, the sum of productivity growth
(a) and the growth rate of the labor force (n). Like Duttís formulation, equation
(2) implies that aggregate-demand e§ects on the level of unemployment translate
into aggregate-demand e§ects on the long-run rate of economic growth; the longrun growth rate becomes endogenous. But the implications are di§erent.
The magnitude of the sensitivity of the natural rate of growth to changes in
employment is critical. A perfectly elastic natural rate of growth ñ as in Duttís
speciÖcation ñ would justify a near-exclusive focus on aggregate demand as the
driver of growth. By contrast, a small elasticity and an upper bound on a + n
in Flaschel and Skottís speciÖcation makes it impossible to ignore interactions
between aggregate demand and the labor market, despite the endogeneity of the
natural growth rate.
Realistically, the sensitivity of the natural growth rate to variations in employment is likely to be small. Firms may have an enhanced incentive to invest
in R&D and to search for labor-saving changes in production if the labor market is tight. But for economies that are already at or close to the technological
frontier, the e§ect surely is limited. The endogeneity of the labor supply may
show greater promise. High demand will pull new groups of workers into the
labor force, and the potential growth rate of the labor supply through immigration may seem almost unlimited. Until, that is, one considers the political
constraints.
According to Lavoie (2014, p. 360) it is a deÖning characteristic of Kaleckian
models of economic growth and distribution that ílabor is assumed not to be a
constraintí; Hein (2014, p. 181), in a similar vein, suggests that in Kaleckian
models íthe labor supply cannot generally be considered a constraint on growthí.
These blanket rejections of the relevance of the labor market and supply constraints for the analysis of economic growth do not facilitate engagement with
open-minded non-post-Keynesians.6 Disregarding this tactical consideration,
a focus on aggregate demand can give highly misleading conclusions if in fact
economic growth is determined by the interaction between di§erent markets,
including goods and labor markets. As a simple example, consider the e§ects
of changes in income distribution on economic growth. A large post-Keynesian
literature has debated whether economic growth is wage-led or proÖt-led. The
question has typically been addressed by examining the e§ects of changes in
income distribution on aggregate demand. In a mature economy, however, the
growth e§ects of a change in distribution cannot be determined by looking
only at aggregate demand; a goods market (aggregate demand) that is proÖt6 To avoid misunderstanding, supply-side constraints have been discussed in the postKeynesian literature; examples include Palley (2002) and SetterÖeld (2013). But the Kaleckian
strand of the literature has had tendency to dismiss the constraints, and overall the constraints
have been given insu¢cient attantion, in my view.
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led may be associated with a wage-led economy in a mature economy (Skott
2017a). Analogously, the overall e§ects on economic growth of the changes in
Önancial behavior that have been associated with íÖnancializationí depend on
the speciÖcation of the full model, including the assumptions that are being
made about both the labor market and the determination of investment (Skott
and Ryoo 2008).
Macroeconomics is about interactions across markets, about general (as opposed to partial) equilibrium. As noted by Keynes ([1936] 1973, p. xxxii),
important mistakes have been made through extending to the system
as a whole conclusions which have been correctly arrived at in respect
of a part of it taken in isolation.
Keynes was commenting on pre-Keynesian theories that looked at the labor
market in isolation and assumed that a decrease in money wages will reduce the
real wage and eliminate unemployment. Methodologically, however, a focus on
goods markets in isolation raises similar issues.
Mainstream theory ignores aggregate demand in the long run. The focus
is exclusively on the determination of aggregate supply (which may be endogenous, as in the myriad of endogenous growth models). Aggregate demand, it is
assumed, will adjust to the supply side. Many post-Keynesian growth models
have taken a completely opposite position. The labor market is ignored, and it
is assumed that supply adjusts to a trajectory of demand that is itself exogenous
with respect to the supply side. Neither of these extreme positions is plausible.

4

Product markets and Harrodian instability

The third example concerns the long-running debate in post-Keynesian economics on utilization rates and the stability of the steady growth path. íKaleckianí models assume that a sustained increase in the utilization rate of capital
will a§ect saving more strongly than investment. This long-run version of a
short-run Keynesian stability condition is rejected by the íHarrodianí side.
The long run has no independent existence; it is just a sequence of short runs.
This oft-repeated statement is correct but does not imply that the assumptions
underlying a short-run analysis can be extended to the long run, as in the
benchmark Kaleckian models. An increase in the utilization rate may have
small immediate e§ects on the rate of accumulation but large cumulative e§ects.
The benchmark Harrodian model captures a stylized version of this possibility:
it assumes that the accumulation rate is predetermined in the short run but
changes in response to deviations of the actual utilization from the desired rate.
My reading of the empirical evidence is that it supports the Harrodian side.
The accumulation rate is not perfectly elastic in the long run, but a sustained
increase in the utilization rate has a powerful cumulative e§ect on investment,
much more powerful than its cumulative e§ect on saving.7 This Önding violates
the extension of the Keynesian stability condition to the long run.
7 Proponents

of the Kaleckian model sometimes seem unaware that their own econometric
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Investment functions are notoriously di¢cult to estimate, but strong behavioral arguments also support Harrodian conclusions. Why would a Örm
keep expanding its capital stock at a constant rate if it had large amounts of
unwanted excess capital capacity? Granted, we live a world of fundamental
uncertainty and Örms cannot maximize proÖts in a precise sense. The íoptimalí
degree of utilization may not, therefore, be well-deÖned. There may be range of
íacceptable utilization ratesí, as suggested by Dutt (1990) and SetterÖeld (2017),
among others. It is also perfectly possible that there is path dependency in the
perceived value of the optimal utilization rate (Lavoie 1995, Dutt 1997, Schoder
2012, Nikiforos 2016). But the plausible range of acceptable utilization rates,
taking into account path dependencies, surely is narrow. Firms that considered
75 percent utilization optimal will not, following a 2-percentage point increase
in the saving rate, start believing that 50 percent is an optimal utilization rate.
Yet, this order of magnitude in the adjustment of the desired utilization rate is
implied by the Kaleckian models (Skott 2012).8
The question is not whether there is a unique, well-deÖned desired utilization rate at which accumulation becomes perfectly elastic. Harrodian instability
does not require a vertical long-run accumulation function. The accumulation
function may have relatively áat segments in a range of acceptable utilization
rates. There may also be path dependencies. The key question is about magnitudes. In this respect there is a close a¢nity with the discussion of endogeneities
in the natural rate of growth. In my view, neither evidence nor behavioral plausibility supports the assumptions that have become common in post-Keynesian
growth models. The natural rate of growth is relatively insensitive to changes in
employment; the medium and long run accumulation rate is relatively sensitive
to sustained changes in the rate of capacity utilization.
A Harrodian instability argument is not the end of the analysis, but the
beginning. Income and employment áuctuate, and at times the áuctuations
develop into severe, prolonged recessions. A narrow analysis of the goods market provides no explanation for the turning points; following a negative shock,
nothing seemingly prevents a cumulative downturn. But stabilizing mechanisms
can be found by looking at interactions across the main markets. Not all macroeconomic models need to include goods, labor and Önancial markets explicitly
ñ the detailed speciÖcation of a model should depend on the particular question
that the model is designed to illuminate. In an analysis of Harrodian instaresults reject the extension of the Keynesian stability condition to the long run (Skott 2012,
2017a).
8 Let
S
K
I
K

=

s'u

=

a + bu

where ' is the output capital ratio at full utilization, u is the utilization rate, and where
s' > b (the stability condition). The average saving rate s is about 20% in the OECD, and
if ' = 0:5; we must have b < 0:1: If, say, b = 0:08 and a = 0:015, the equilibrium solution for
utilization is u = 0:75 when s = 0:2 and 0:5 when s = 0:22:
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bility, however, the interaction between the goods and labor markets becomes
essential.
An increase in aggregate demand raises the employment rate, and this increase in employment generates feedback e§ects to other variables, including
aggregate demand. High employment ñ a small reserve army of labor ñ undermines discipline in the factories (Kalecki [1943] 1971, p. 141), and one would
expect this deterioration of the business climate to put a damper on Örmsí investment decisions as well as on their willingness to expand output and employment;
Skott and Zipperer (2012) Önd support for this expectation.9 Another set of effects relate to wage setting and ináation. Wage bargaining does not set the real
wage, but nominal wage formation is ináuenced by the state of the labor market. Ináation and the emergence of supply constraints in turn a§ect monetary
and Öscal policy. Central banks move to raise interest rates, automatic Öscal
stabilizers kick in when employment increases, and discretionary Öscal policy
may follow, especially if the movements in the employment rate are large and
sustained.
The local instability of the steady growth path allows one to tell an integrated story of endogenous business cycles with bounded áuctuations in the
unemployment rate. The Harrodian mechanism generates local instability; the
interaction of the goods market with labor markets and economic policy turns
the instability into bounded áuctuations (Skott 1989, 2015, von Arnim and Barrales 2015). The interactions between goods and labor markets also align the
average growth rate and the ínatural rate of growthí to each other; as argued
above, the natural growth rate may be endogenous and ináuenced by aggregate
demand.
A recent literature recognizes the potential Harrodian instability but o§ers
a di§erent route to stabilization: autonomous demand may stabilize the economy.10 Consumption by capitalists, residential investment, and exports are seen
as the main private-sector candidates for autonomous demand. These components of aggregate demand can, it is suggested, be taken as exogenous: they
evolve independently of past, current and expected future movements in output.
Assuming that autonomous demand grows at a constant rate, the growth
rate of the economy as a whole may in some circumstances get pulled towards
that same rate. But this stabilization argument faces an obvious empirical
challenge: the private-sector components of demand that have been singled out
as potentially autonomous are much more volatile than aggregate output, and
it is hard to see how they could serve as a stabilizing force.11 At the very
9 High

employment is correlated with high aggregate demand. Employment rates, however,
are not perfectly correlated with utilization rates, and the positive partial e§ect on investment of a rise in utilization (holding constant the employment rate) is perfectly consistent
with a negative partial e§ect of employment (holding constant the utilization rate). Capital
utilization rates should not be used as a measure of the state of the labor market.
1 0 The contributions include Serrano and Freitas (2015), Cesaratto (2015), Allain (2015) and
Lavoie (2016); Skott (2017b, 2018a) and Nikiforos (2018) present critiques.
1 1 Stabilization via exports raises additional questions. How can exports stabilize the world
economy? What stabilizes the foreign incomes that supposedly stabilizes the home countryís
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least there is a strong disconnect between the theoretical models that have been
proposed and the evidence: the models assume that autonomous demand grows
at a constant rate.
Government spending arguably could be seen as exogenous. But it would
seem peculiar for Keynesians to advocate a constant-growth rule for government
consumption. As a descriptive proposition, moreover, the government sector
acts as a stabilizer through automatic Öscal stabilizers as well as discretionary
policy. Both prescriptively and descriptively a ífunctional Önanceí perspective
on Öscal policy would seem more fruitful than theories that negate any link
between the state of the economy and government policy.
Fiebiger and Lavoie (2018) appear to abandon the concern with instability and the stabilizing e§ect of autonomous demand. Instead, they see both
cycles and long-run growth as being driven by autonomous demand, singling
out residential investment as the most important component of autonomous demand. Treating residential investment as exogenous, however, áies in the face
of both evidence and theory. The housing market and residential investment
react strongly to movements in interest rates, and movements in interest rates
react strongly to output and employment. The fact that residential investment
ñ like other components of demand ñ can be subject to exogenous shocks does
not imply that the entire trajectory of residential investment should be viewed
as exogenous. We can and should do better. Residential investment is carried
out by goal oriented decision makers; the behavior of builders and households ñ
and the Önancial constraints that they face ñ can be analyzed. There is a large
endogenous element.
The current popularity of models that emphasize autonomous demand as a
driver of economic growth appears to be based on a perception that somehow
these models are particularly íKeynesianí: the models make investment "in
both the long run and the short run, independent of the savings that would
be forthcoming from the normal utilisation of productive capacity" (Cesaratto
2015, p. 154). This argument is puzzling. Keynes did not ignore the supply
side, and disregarding exegetical issues, why would one insist that changes in
the rate of saving can have no e§ects on current or future investment? Do saving
rates not ináuence aggregate demand and the utilization rate? And do Örms
not react to changes in capacity utilization?
The claim for the unique status of autonomous demand even seems internally
inconsistent: how can it be íKeynesianí to have growth be driven by how much
households choose to consume out of any given income but íun-Keynesianí to
have growth driven by how much households choose to save out of any given
income? Consider a simple consumption function
C = a + bY
If stories that link the trajectories of investment and output to exogenous movements in a (autonomous demand) are truly Keynesian, why is it not Keynesian
to link trajectories of investment and output to exogenous movements in b?
exports?
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Changes in and a and b both a§ect the average saving rate for any given level
of income.
Autonomous demand can be used to stabilize a Harrodian economy and
ensure that utilization converges asymptotically to the desired rate precisely
because the trajectory of autonomous demand generates changes in the average
saving rate associated with any given level of income. Moreover, an increase in
the growth rate of autonomous demand leads to an increase in the steady-growth
value of the saving rate, and the model implies that in steady growth the level of
investment will be equal to the level of saving that would be forthcoming from
the normal utilization of capital. The hallmark of the autonomous-demand story
is not the independence of investment from saving, but the lack of behavioral
explanations for the key assumptions about changes in saving.
Serrano and Freitas (2015) make a slightly broader appeal, suggesting that
autonomous demand represents a "true heterodox alternative" because it allows for a "reconciliation of demand-led growth, exogenous distribution and a
tendency to normal degree of capacity utilization" (p. 17). This argument is
related to Lavoieís (2016) claims that "the paradox of thrift or the paradox of
costs can be preserved ... by taking into account an autonomous growth component" (p. 195). One should be uncomfortable, I think, with arguments that
justify assumptions by their ability to deliver desired conclusions. But the argument is strange for another reason: one does not need autonomous demand
in order to get Keynesian conclusions. Harrodian models with feedback e§ects
from the labor market are perfectly consistent with Keynesian conclusions.
Using a Öx-price model with an exogenous proÖt share, (i) an increase in the
average saving rate may reduce both the employment rate and the long-run rate
of growth, (ii) an increase in animal spirits may boost both the employment rate
and the long-run rate of growth, and (iii) an increase in the proÖt share may lead
to a decline in employment and the rate of growth (Skott 2015, Skott 2018b).12
The treatment of the proÖt share as exogenous is questionable, however, and
notions of wage-led or proÖt-led economic growth cease to be well-deÖned if
the proÖt share is itself endogenous: the reduced-form correlation of the proÖt
share with other variables will, in general, depend of the nature of the underlying
exogenous shocks (Skott 2017a). With this caveat, similar íKeynesian resultsí
can be obtained using a range of other models with Harrodian instability and
stabilizing feedback e§ects from the labor market to wages, prices, investment
and economic policy.13
Formal models of endogenous cycles typically do not include stochastic shocks,
and autonomous shocks clearly do occur. A new government, for instance, may
raise military spending for reasons that are completely unrelated to the state of
1 2 Fiebiger and Lavoie (2017) claim that the introduction of a labor market makes for ía
supply-side explanation of growth and cylesí. This claim would have some validity if directed
against the original Goodwin model. As a critique of my integration of Keynesian and Marxian
elements, the claim is harder to understand. Aggregate demand plays a key role in the
determination of the cyclical pattern, the average rate of employment over time, and the
long-run rate of growth. Is that a supply-side explanation of growth and cycles?
1 3 Fazzari et al. (2013) present an intermediate model that combines supply constraints
from the labor market with autonomous demand.
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the economy. Animal spirits, consumer conÖdence, or the prevalence of credit
constraints can also be subject to shocks. There is nothing new in this. Traditional Keynesian models have always been used to analyze demand shocks of
this kind. Shocks to government consumption are also an integral part of mainstream DSGE models for that matter. Exogenous shocks will add irregularity
to the áuctuations in non-stochastic models of endogenous cycles. They do not
justify treating entire trajectories of demand as exogenous.

5

Conclusion

Open minded mainstream macroeconomists recognize that current DSGE represent íbadly áawed descriptions of realityí but maintain that ístarting from
explicit microfoundations is clearly essentialí (Blanchard 2016).
The implied methodological commitment to the Lucas revolution must be rejected. The macroeconomic mainstream conáates goal orientation with a highly
restrictive version of optimization, and compounds the problem by ignoring interactions across markets and between distinct economic decision makers. Microeconomic behavior, moreover, takes place within an institutional structure
that is intrinsically ímacroí; the structure of a corporate economy, for instance,
has implications for the determination of the average saving rate, as argued in
section 2.
A rejection of the DSGE paradigm should not, however, lead one to reject goal oriented behavior and the need for microeconomic analysis. Goal
orientation does not exclude deviations from ëhomo economicusí. Households
and workers have cognitive limitations and are ináuenced by habits and social
norms. The conventional element in notions of fairness provides an illustration
that goal orientation does not exclude path dependency.
Strict optimization is impossible in a world of uncertainty, but goal orientation still has bite, especially on the Örm side; the Kaleckian investment function
is behaviorally unconvincing. This argument may be increasingly recognized,
but the attempt to address Harrodian instability by an appeal to autonomous
demand is also unconvincing. Residential investment does not grow at a rate
that is exogenous and constant. It is carried out by goal oriented decision makers
who are ináuenced by movements in income and interest rates.
The interaction across markets (and between markets and economic policy)
provides a solution to the Harrodian puzzle. Mainstream analysis of the medium
and long run errs by ignoring the role of aggregate demand, but that is no reason
for post-Keynesians to move to the opposite extreme and reject the relevance of
the labor market and the supply side for economic growth. Aggregate demand
in one of the determinants of long-run growth, but it is not the only one.
The development of post-Keynesian theory in this behavioral and structuralist direction may require models that are more complex than the baseline postKeynesian models of the goods market Complexity is not a virtue in itself, but
neither is oversimpliÖcation. In a (possibly apocryphal) quote Einstein put it

13

succinctly, íeverything should be made as simple as possible, but no simplerí.14
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